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Treaties As a Source of General Rules of International Law,* 
by Anthony D’Amato, 3 Harvard International Law Journal 1-43 (1962) 
 
Abstract:  Attempts a theoretical explanation of the power of treaties to extend their rules to nations not parties to 
them—to rationalize, in a nonpejorative use of that term, the Court=s citation of the Bancroft treaties in Nottebohm 
and its use of treaty provisions in other cases—and to provide a basis for the continued use of the contents of treaties 
in assessing the requirements of international law.  Thus this paper is basically argumentative—it attempts to state 
what the law ought to be by demonstrating that the law as it is logically compels the adoption of the present thesis. 
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[pg1]** I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1955 the International Court of Justice rendered its highly significant decision in the 
Nottebohm case. FN1 Cited in the opinion were the Bancroft treaties FN2 and the Pan-American 
Convention of 1906.FN3 Judge ad hoc M. Guggenheim, dissenting, stated that he considered it 
incorrect to regard the eighteen or so Bancroft treatiesFN4 Aas constituting a precedent@ for the 
decision inasmuch as they were bilateral treaties involving neither of the parties to the 
Nottebohm case.FN5 Indeed, the use of a set of treaties and a unilateral convention by the Court 
as the only specific precedents cited came as a surprise to many observers.  Professor Josef Kunz 
has commented that the Bancroft treaties were Abinding only on the contracting parties@ and thus 
Anot pertinent@ to the Nottebohm case.FN6 He concludes that there is no international law 
precedent for Nottebohm.FN7  This is a startling conclusion, given the significance of the case.  
[pg2] But it would be an inaccurate conclusion, given the hypothesis that treaties are capable of 
constituting precedents of general international law binding on nonsignatories. 
 
The Nottebohm case is by no means an isolated example of such use of treaties.  The 
reports of international tribunals often have reference to citations of treaties introduced by the 
parties as support for their contentions although the parties were not signatories of the treaties: 
FN8 Colombia cited a large number of extradition treaties in the Asylum case, FN9 which the 
International Court of Justice found inapposite to the question of diplomatic (nonterritorial) 
asylum without stating whether such treaties were irrelevant as precedent.FN10 Some courts 
have found that similar provisions in many extradition treaties have become applicable to states 
which have not expressly accepted the treaties.FN11  On its first decision, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice inferred from treaties creating the Panama and Suez Canals a rule that a 
state remains neutral even though it allows passage through an international waterway of ships 
carrying munitions to belligerents.FN12 In the Lotus caseFN13 the Court interpreted the 
intended scope of rules in a large number of treaties, though refusing to make any dedications 
therefrom because the treaty provisions neither related to common-law offenses nor to collision 
cases.FN14 Other examples of the use of treaties as general precedents by  international arbitral 
and judicial tribunals have been cited.FN15 Particularly in the large number of [pg3] treaties 
relating to international rivers have writers begun to discern the emergence of a requirement of 
arbitration or negotiation if the upper riparian threatens substantial diversion of the waters.FN16 
 
It may in any case be unwise to dismiss the considered judgment of the International 
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Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case quite as easily as does Kunz.  Indeed the Court may be 
thought to have extended an implied invitation to writers reflecting on its decision to analyze the 
question whether treaties may constitute precedents in international law binding on 
nonsignatories.FN17 
 
II.  SCOPE  OF  STUDY 
 
In this paper we are considering not the treaty alone, but the implementation of the treaty 
in actual practice,FN18 and I will be contending not merely that a large number of treaties create 
a rule, but that a single, isolated treaty on an issue should contain as much precedent value 
before an international tribunal as the practice it includes would have contained, had the practice 
occurred in absence of the treatyFN19—and in some cases, for reasons that will later be [pg4] 
shown, more precedent value than the practice; that there is no difference in kind between one 
and one hundred treaties; that the same logical explanation applies to all, though the decisive 
power of one hundred treaties is necessarily stronger than the power of one. 
 
I wish to attempt a theoretical explanation of the power of treaties to extend their rules to 
nations not parties to them—to rationalize, in a nonpejorative use of that term, the Court=s 
citation of the Bancroft treaties in Nottebohm and its use of treaty provisions in other cases—and 
to provide a basis for the continued use of the contents of treaties in assessing the requirements 
of international law.  Thus this paper is basically argumentative—it attempts to state what the 
law ought to be by demonstrating that the law as it is logically compels the adoption of the 
present thesis. 
 
At the turn of the century, it appears, a large number of publicists essayed the rudiments 
of a view that treaties Aare in some sense a fountain of law to others than the signatory states.@ 
FN20 But then there appeared the writings of W.E. Hall, who viewed treaties as contracts and 
laid down the Anglo-American view of the subject which has persisted rather steadily since then. 
 Treaties, wrote Hall, are either declaratory of law, or in derogatory of it, or Amere bargains@ in 
which, without reference to law, something has been bought for a price.FN21 Many writers since 
Hall have adopted this line of thought, with the result that treaties are broadly believed to be all 
but irrelevant to international law—for if a treaty can be either in confirmation or derogation of 
existing law, then barring a statement within the treaty as to which of the alternatives is the case, 
an observer must look outside the treaty to discover the law.  The treaty, then has been entirely 
irrelevant to determination of the law. 
 
Some writers following after Hall have argued that a treaty must be in derogation of 
existing law, for otherwise there would be no need to enter into the agreement.  But it seems 
clear that such a view is not in accord with practice.  It may easily be said that Awhen the law is 
uncertain, practical men will naturally seek to clarify the position by making special 
arrangements.@FN22 Even  where the law is clear it may be reasonable for the parties to desire 
[pg5] evidence as concrete as a signed statement of intent.  Certainly it would be assuming too 
much to declare that states are invariably aware of what the customary international law is in the 
absence of a treaty—in instances of doubt or difficulties of determination it must be appealing to 
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take the relatively simple step of making an agreement which will be binding whatever the 
custom proves to be. 
 
I do not suppose that Hall=s original statement is entirely unreasonable.  One may argue, 
however, that it has proven rather a sterile line of thought, and by its general acceptance has 
discouraged views which might have been more fruitful, depriving the international law of 
benefits which the consideration of treaty provisions might have produced. 
 
Specifically, with the emergence of new problems and new solutions to old problems, the 
needs and possibilities of law constantly change.  How, then, is a nation to deal with a problem 
when custom is outmoded?  How, in the absence of an international legislature, can unworkable 
customary law be changed?  A nation can, if it wishes, simply act illegally.  But more often it 
will prudently conclude a treaty or treaties. 
 
Indeed, most of the substantive rules regulating international affairs today are found in 
the myriad treaties concluded between and among nations.  Customary international rules make 
up only a small portion of  the operative international norms, and daily the sphere of treaty 
regulation intrudes on what is left of the area of customary practice.  Some arenas of 
international law have developed so completely in modern times that they have been preempted 
entirely by treaties.  For example, it would be hard to find customary rules regulating flights 
through the airspace in the sense of Acustom@ apart from treaty.  Treaties have given rise to the 
international rule of sovereignty over the superjacent airspace.  But Ait would betray confusion of 
thought,@ states Hyde, Ato intimate that in the absence of agreement there is, in an international 
sense, no law of the air.@FN23  This law of sovereignty, binding on all nations, has not arisen 
from the classic usage-into-custom pattern of customary international law.  Bilateral and 
multilateral treaties have been concluded on this and thousands of subjects, and the rule-making 
potentialities of these treaties thus becomes an important question in the ordering of international 
life.  To hold uncompromisingly to the Hall position that these treaties are nothing more than 
contracts, to declare that a nation lacking a specific treaty must abide by hundred-year-old 
custom even if several treaties have pre-empted the field in more recent years, is to give the 
Adead hand@ of custom unreasonable sway over modernized and progressive agreements.FN24 If 
[pg6] indeed most of the developments in international matters in the last half century have been 
treaty developments, to deny their relevance to international law would be to nullify the effects 
of recent legal thinking and international events and refuse the courts benefit from them.  It 
would seem that the carefully considered opinion of the treaty makers deserves some weight, 
particularly if it is widespread and reflected in several treaties and agreements. 
 
It is, of course, much easier simply to declare that no amount of contracting can change 
existing law, and that in the absence of a specific treaty hundred-year-old custom emerges again 
to rule the parties.  Certainly the ease of this reasoning lends it a surface attractiveness, and I do 
not promise an equally facile theory.  Rather, an examination must be made in some detail of the 
nature of a treaty and the nature of customary law, as well as the kinds of treaties that are capable 






III.  THE  PARITY  OF  CUSTOM  AND  CONVENTION 
 
International law has allowed for a curious inroad into the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosuntFN25 in that it is said that when a rule is repeated in a large number of treaties the 
rule Apasses@ into customary law, or that when an important multilateral convention has been in 
existence for some time, its provisions become absorbed into the stream of customary 
international law.FN26 Yet [pg7] the manner in which the treaty rule becomes a customary rule 
has not been examined satisfactorily by publicists.  There is great disagreement as to the amount 
of time which must elapse, for example, before such treaties become absorbed into customary 
law.  Dr. Jenks regards the pace as very slow; he states that it is doubtful that by the time of the 
first World War the 1856 Declaration of Paris had acquired the status of customary law.FN27 
But Corbett writes that the terms of the Declaration of Paris became part of the customary law of 
nations by the time of the Spanish-American War, when the United States Department of State 
may be taken to have assented by issuing such rules to American diplomats.FN28 
Schwarzenberger pinpoints the time at which a rule becomes transformed into international 
customary law as the time it Abegins to be considered self-evident and is discarded in drafting as 
redundant . . . .@FN29 But surely it is strange to look to the treaties themselves as evidencing a 
time when the old treaty rules have passed into customary law, since the contracting parties are 
free, by virtue of the freedom of contract, to accept or reject the old rules.  The one thing that 
customary law by and large does not do is tell nations what to put in their treaties. 
 
On closer examination it is found that the language of publicists is far from clear on the 
process of transformation of treaty into custom.  Corbett refers to provisions in consular treaties 
regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over merchant vessels in foreign ports as Anow in the 
process of hardening into law.@FN30 Pradier-Fodere indicates that a uniform resolution of a 
matter in a series of treaties Ainterprets@ (traduisant) the opinion of nations on the matter.FN31 
Fauchille omits to mention any [pg8] Ahardening@ process, simply saying that identical 
stipulations in consular, extradition, and copy right treaties, for example, give birth to a rule of 
customary law.FN32 In the Wimbledon case the Court applied conventions relating to other 
waterways to the case at hand and found the treaties to be Aillustrations of the general 
opinion.@FN33 In the Mavromatis case, a general conclusion was based on the Areservation made 
in many arbitration treaties,@ although citations were not given.FN34 Yet the International Court 
has not applied the psychological element, opinio juris, to any of these cases, and thus Sørensen 
finds it difficult to explain the cases other than by considering it a matter of the relatively free 
discretion of the Court.FN35 
 
It is submitted that jurists who have had occasion to deal with the question of the 
Apassage@ into customary law of provisions in treaties have not yet fully examined the matter and 
have for the most part covered a very nebulous idea with words such as Ahardening@ and 
Atransformation.@  It is inherently difficult to find evidence that provisions in a treaty have 
become part of customary international law in the sense of usage and opinio juris; this is due to 
the fact that the nations concerned with the particular activity are usually the signatories or later 
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ratifiers of the multi-lateral convention, or the signors of bilateral treaties.  And since these 
treaties usually have not expired, it is natural that the involved nations consider their obligations 
to stem from the treaty rather than from a Platonic sort of international law which the treaties 
have created.  Further, the great divergences of view as to the length of time it takes for the 
treaties to Aripen@ into customary international law bears witness to the inability to find any 
evidence external to the treaty of such process of ripening.FN36  These considerations show the 
difficulty of proving that treaties have entered into the stream of customary international law in 
the sense that the jurists= making the claim think of customary law.  But the fact still remains that 
[pg9] the courts and writers in the field regard similar provisions in a large number of treaties or 
a provision in a large multilateral treaty as having a thrust on the universal international law.  Is 
it not possible to conclude that the treaties themselves have become recognized—albeit dimly—
as sources of the law of nations in much the same manner that the practice of states, absent a 
treaty, becomes binding? 
 
I have often wondered if there does not exist too much of a fondness for the purity of 
customary law, and a resulting distaste for the intricacies of treaty law.  Jurists seem often to 
claim too much for customary law.  For example, Oppenheim and othersFN37 say that it is a rule 
of customary international law that treaty obligations are binding.  But how could this statement 
be proved?  It is just as easy to say that treaty law accounts for the binding force of treaty law, or 
of customary law.  Or that the norm pacta sunt servanda applies equally to treaty law and 
custom.  The same fondness for customary law may lie behind the attempt to find the Apassage@ 
into such law of repeated treaty provisions, even in the face of extreme difficulty in explaining 
how this comes about.   
 
International rules as to the interpretation of treaties are not themselves traceable solely 
to customary rules.  International law indicates Awhen an agreement becomes binding, how it is 
to be interpreted during its effective life, and how it may be terminated.@FN38 But these rules 
did not come about merely because of the way in which nations in practice felt an obligation to 
interpret the treaties; they also derived from rules found by the courts to be most consistent with 
the intention of the parties.  The fact that a court examines a treaty does not mean that its finding 
is necessarily a rule of customary international law.  Indeed, most of the rules of treaty 
interpretation are probably traceable to treaties, as Schwarzenberger suggests.FN39 Later treaties 
may spell out, for instance, what is meant by a most-favored nation clause in an earlier treaty, 
and in the constant process of revision of treaties by nations general rules emerge.  It is treaty 
law that has laid down the most-favored national standard containing the features that the 
standard Ais incompatible with discrimination against the beneficiary, that it does not exclude 
discrimination in favor of the beneficiary, that third States constitute the tertium comparationis, 
and that it does not require compliance with any definite and objective rules of conduct.@FN40 
These rules of law are not customary in origin, but rather indicate that a great amount of 
international [pg10] law is traceable rather directly to treaties which are not necessarily required 
to have the express consent of the parties in a particular litigation in order for the treaties to be 
relevant to their case. 
 
In sum, my intention is to suggest, not that treaties can form or pass into customary law, 
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or even that they pass after a certain amount of time into a comparable treaty law, but that 
treaties, from the very first treaty on a question, are useful as precedents before courts and form 
an international treaty law, its force varying with the number or breadth of the treaties, which is 
comparable to, and as valid as, customary law. 
 
It has been said that there is doubt whether, despite the myriad treaties on extradition, a 
state has an obligation to extradite in the absence of a treaty.  Does this quite reasonable doubt 
indicate authority against the thesis of this paper?  I think not.  Rather it seems to be an 
illustration of the situation described above—the separateness of treaty law and customary law. 
 
To the extent that an international tribunal might now hold that there is no duty of 
extradition in the absence of a treaty, the decision may be explained as the result of the presence 
of the contrary right of asylum in customary international law.FN41 It is of course easier for a 
rule of law to become binding on all states if there is no ingrained rule to the contrary.  Here, if 
the question were only one of extradition or nonextradition, the various treaties by now would 
probably have set up a different treaty practice for nations.  But the customary right of asylum 
had to be worn down and offered considerable resistance to the rule of extradition.  Specifically, 
it might be said that implicit in the terms of the normal extradition treaty is the safeguarding of 
the right of asylum in cases where the exact treaty provisions are not met.  This contrary 
presumption is not true of many other areas of international relations.  But even despite the 
pressure of the rule of asylum, a number of cases have indicated that the recurrence of similar 
provisions in extradition treaties has set up a duty of extradition. FN42 And, very significantly, 
there is an increasing sense of duty to conclude an extradition treaty—Hyde says it has become 
regarded almost as an unfriendly act for one state persistently to refuse to enter into an 
extradition treaty with another.FN43  The paucity of cases on the extradition of common 
criminals, as opposed to political refugees, about whom the treaties are not uniform, further 
[pg11] suggests that there is considerable inroad on the right of asylum in practice.  AIn actual 
fact,@ Morgenstern observes, A>common= criminals are usually surrendered.@FN44 
 
It seems clear that the matter of extradition is an example of simple clash which the 
above discussion of the parity of treaty law and customary law explains and which parity is in 
turn clarified by the clash.  Customary law and treaty law are two separate and comparable 
forces at work.  They happened, in the matter of extradition to have precisely opposing points of 
view.  The fact that nations appear lately to feel an obligation to conclude extradition treaties 




IV.  SOME  DEFINITIONS 
 
A.  Treaties 
 
Hereinafter when the word "treaty" is used, it is intended to mean any international 
agreement.  Jessup writes:  AIt is of no legal consequence . . . whether an agreement between or 
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among states is called a treaty, a convention, a statute, an agreement, a protocol, or a covenant or 
charter.@FN45 
 
B.  Source 
 
The term "source of law" has been subjected to vast criticism, for it has been said to 
denote ambiguously the cause of international law, its origin, its basis of validity, evidence as to 
its content, and its "immediate," "formal" or "material" source.FN46 Professor Briggs has 
mentioned that the meaning assigned to the term "source" is Aoften colored by  . . . doctrinal 
predispositions as to the basis of legal obligations in international law.@FN47 A certain amount 
of common sense may go a long way toward obviating these apparent difficulties with language. 
 Thus a proposal that treaties are a source of international law means that courts, international 
lawyers, and state [pg12] department officials will look to treaties in order to determine Awhat 
are the rules of international law on a given question at any particular time.@FN48 
 
A further clarification is needed with respect to the present thesis:  that while treaties are 
quite often referred to as Asources of international law,@FN49 writers for the most part are 
referring to treaties as obligatory only for the signatory states and therefore are referring to the 
realm of "conventional" as opposed to "customary" law.FN50 The present paper attacks this 
usage, and in referring to treaties as a source of law means that a treaty signed only by states A 
and B may be a source of rules—though not the only source and in any given case perhaps not 
the most important—for states C, D, and E as well. 
 
C.  Evidence 
 
It is not unusual for writers to state that treaties may be evidence of international law.  
However, the meaning that the overwhelming majority intend is rather like the meaning of 
"evidence" in the statement, Aa lawyer=s opinion is evidence in the state of the law.@  Evidence in 
that sense is a sort of weak indication but little more.  It is not even accurate to say, in that sense, 
that treaties are evidence of international law, since, as Hall pointed out, signatories may have no 
intention of embodying the law.FN51 And even should they state the intent to do so they well 
might be entirely in error. 
 
A preferable meaning for the word "evidence" would be that employed in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states that the Court shall apply 
Ainternational [pg13] custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law.@  In this sense 
evidence becomes a synonym for Asource,@ since in effect a court looks to international custom in 
order to find evidence of legal precedent for determining the rights and duties of states.  
Lauterpacht has indicated with respect to municipal decisions that it is excess verbalization to 
distinguish between custom and evidence of custom.FN52 
 
 




A.  A Treaty Need Not be a Contract 
 
The Anglo-American view that treaties have no effect on third parties—except in the 
third-party beneficiary situation, which is excluded from this paper because such treaties apply 
only to particular third parties and are not potential sources of general rules applying to all 
states—derives in large part from the eagerness to equate treaties with municipal-law 
contracts.FN53 This attitude tends to obscure the true nature of treaties, by providing too facile 
an analogy.  It is true that treaties are agreements, but so also is a Constitution an agreement 
among the citizens.  The Charter of the United Nations is an example of a treaty agreement that 
much more closely resembles a Constitution than a contract.  Statutes are also agreements—
bargains between legislators, and compromises between departments of the sovereign power in a 
state, such as the system of checks and balances in the United States.  Similarly, treaties are 
agreements between sovereigns, and many multipartite conventions resemble legislation much 
more than they resemble contracts—Manley O. Hudson has collected over a thousand of these in 
his volumes entitled International Legislation.  Unlike contracts, treaties may create new 
sovereign states, mandates and trust territories; they may create international waterways, 
servitudes, and other permanent changes in status.FN54 They may establish international 
tribunals and other bodies with general rule-making authority.  Nor are treaties interpreted as are 
contracts:  for example, the rules relating to duress are entirely different, and the doctrine of 
clausula rebus sic stantibus if applied to common-law contracts Awould have a devastating 
effect.@FN55 In dealing with [pg14] the conflict of law-making treaties, exclusive reliance 
cannot be placed on municipal contract analogies.FN56 The fact that travaux préparatoires are 
relevant in treaty interpretation is not more analogous to examining the intent of the parties to a 
contract than it is to looking to the intent of a legislature or the purpose of the framers of a 
Constitution.  In sum, the effect of treaties in international law should not be prejudged on the 
basis of an apparent similarity with the simple municipal-law contract. 
 
B.  Kinds of Treaties—Bargain or Common Aim 
 
What sort of treaty may contain potential objective rules of international law?  This 
question is by no means a new one to international jurisprudence; it was considered as early as 
1877 by BergbohmFN57 and in 1899 by Triepel.FN58  These writers and the Italian schoolFN59 
created a classification distinguishing between rechtsgeschaeftlichen and rechtssetzende treaties, 
the former corresponding to a contract in municipal law and the latter to an act of the 
legislature.FN60 This distinction has pervaded international literatureFN61 but it has been for 
the most part a solely verbal distinction in Anglo-American writings.FN62  Thus 
OppenheimFN63 and BrierlyFN64 accept certain treaties as "law-making,"but do not draw 
consequences at all different from them than they draw from "contract" treaties.  Lord McNair 
finds that the law-making treaties have an effect on third parties, but he confines his inquiry to 
huge multilateral conventions or to situations where the effect is a particular one, such as 
creating a status for the Aaland Island.FN65 [pg15] But the continental jurists did not elaborate 
the distinction between contract and law-making treaties solely for verbal purposes; they 
considered that a difference in kind between the types of treaties led to different juristic results 




Perhaps the simplest distinction that could be offered is that law-making treaties lay 
down a general rule of conduct or rights and privileges and duties binding on both parties which 
is to take effect upon ratification or conclusion of the treaty and continue in effect.  Ordinary 
contractual treaties lack such a rule.  Rather they are addressed to an exchange of dissimilar 
goods, as in the case of a sale, or of dissimilar practices, as when nation A agrees not to divert 
water that flows into nation B if Nation B, the lower riparian, grants navigational access to the 
sea.  Conveyances, or in general dispositive treaties are of this contractual type.  Jessup writes 
that Asome agreements are essentially contracts, as, for example, agreements for the sale of 
surplus war supplies, loan agreements, or agreements for the maintenance of national 
monuments or memorials.@FN66  Treaties which relate to a determinate business, such as a treaty 
of servitude, may be excluded for the purpose of this paper, even though they often have obvious 
effect on nonsignatories since they affect status.FN67 
 
Bergbohm, and later Lord McNair, distinguish contract from law-making treaties in that 
in the former each party wants something that the other party has and is willing to give up 
something else in return.  Thus the arrangement is one of mutual exchange.FN68  It may be 
noted that such an arrangement could not lead to a change in general law without the most 
disruptive and unsettling results for everyone concerned.  For example, if nations A and B have 
agreed that A will give so many bushels of wheat to B each year for five years in return for so 
many of B=s sheep each year.  It does not become a rule of law that every nation must sell wheat 
for sheep or that such agreements must be made in five year units or that the wheat-to-sheep 
ratio must be the same for all nations.  Scelle sums it up by saying that contractual treaties 
Arealize a particular juridical operation@ and Adisappear as soon as that operation is realized.@  
Law-making treaties Apresent an entirely different interest of stability and generality.  They aim 
to establish a rule of  law and are true legislative acts.@FN69 
 
It seems irrelevant to draw a distinction between multilateral and bilateral treaties, 
although this is often done.FN70 If state A signs a bilateral agreement with B, B signs a similar 
agreement with C, and C signs a similar agreement with A, the effect is exactly [pg16] the same 
as if A, B and C joined in a multilateral convention; the same reasoning applies to a sixty nation 
multilateral convention.  The difference is only one of degree—the rule of law will gain 
increasing force with an increase in the number of states involved, just as does a rule of 
customary law, but the form of the treaty which assures their participation is not relevant. 
 
Treaties which lay down a rule for both parties have the power to lay down an ordering 
different in kind from contract treaties.  Here nation A does not give up something in exchange 
for a right for something belonging to B, but rather each nation joins with the other in 
proclaiming a rule which is binding on both.  It is not accurate to speak here of exchange—since 
the same thing does not change hands, or if it did would be merely a futile gesture as exchanging 
a dollar bill for a dollar bill.  Professor Fuller has elaborated the distinction between organization 
by reciprocity and organization by common aim.FN71 ATo make organization by reciprocity 
effective the participants must want different things,@ he writes; organization by common aims 
requires that the participants want the same thing or things.@FN72 Gihl has tried to break down 
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the fundamental difference between these two types of agreement by the argument that in both 
situations the parties want the same things:  in the law-making treaty they both want the Awhole 
of the arrangement comprised in their agreement.@FN73 But this criticism, as Levi tends to 
suggest, FN74 is irrelevant:  of course in each situation, since A and B are entering into a treaty, 
both may have consented to the whole of the arrangement.  The distinction is that in one case 
they expect to derive from their agreement different things and in the other case the same thing 
or things.  As may be imagined, the distinction usually becomes very clear in practice. 
 
A different objection might be raised along these lines:  that even though A and B had the 
common aim to set down a rule of law in a treaty, and both sides did in fact sign such a treaty, 
nevertheless there may be an underlying bargain if either side paid something extra to the other 
to induce it to sign the treaty.  The answer to this is that it, also, is logically irrelevant.  The 
motives of A and B may be entirely different for entering into a treaty.  A, for instance, might like 
to sign treaties, while B might be generally intractable, and do nothing unless payment is offered. 
 Or, A may be a better bargainer than B, or may be mistaken as to the desirability of signing the 
treaty.  But the resulting rule of law given effect by the treaty is the same for both sides—if not, 
of course, it is not a law-making treaty.  The fact that the rule of law is the same for both sides is 
the operative fact, just as it is in municipal law where the motives of legislators in swapping 
votes or pleasing [pg17] minority groups in the constituency are irrelevant to the application of 
resulting legislation. 
 
The difference between law-making treaties and simple agreements of exchange is 
outlined at this point not only to emphasize that the present thesis is concerned primarily with 




VI.  TREATIES AND  CUSTOM  COMPARED 
 
A.  Theory of the Tacit Treaty 
 
A few decades ago a few writers of positivist convictions publicized the theory that 
international custom is in fact tacit treaty, distinguishable from treaties Astrictly so-called@ only 
by its form.FN76 The idea was not new.  It dated back to Grotius, Bynkershoek, and Vattel, but 
the dualistic doctrine contributed to its revival.FN77 The theory went out of favor, and it has 
been until recent years fashionable to discredit it along with the general discrediting of the 
Aexaggerated regard for sovereignty@FN78 thought to underlie the theories of its proponents.  
The doctrine of tacit [pg18] treaties has been labeled Apurely fictitious@FN79 or, alternatively, 
criticized on specific grounds which had a surface plausibility.  In the latter manner Brierly 
writes that the theory of implied consent as the basis of custom fails to explain why international 
law is binding and observed by other nations which cannot be said to have consented expressly 
or impliedly. FN80  AA customary rule,@ he states, Ais observed not because it has been consented 
to, but because it is believed to be binding. . . .@FN81 Such a criticism misconstrues the tacit 
treaty theory.  The theory does not hold that in order for nation D to be bound by a rule of 
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customary law nation D must itself have consented impliedly to the rule.  Rather, once a rule has 
become customary among nations A, B and C, the general doctrine of international law will 
apply such a rule to nation D.  The reason for Brierly=s confusion appears to be his own 
conception that the words  "consent" and "treaty," once mentioned, must be strictly limited to the 
participants of the consent or the signatories of the treaty.FN82  It is clear that this reasoning, if 
it is the source of Brierly=s confusion, is circular.FN83 While international custom is grounded in 
the consent of specific nations, it comes to be of general validity, even as applied to nations who 
have given no tract of consent.  This is true in practice whatever theory is given to explain it—
the [pg19] last states involved will be bound by international custom.  It may be helpful to 
consider that the first states have in a sense acted as representatives for the entire body of states 
in the matter.FN84  To say, as Brierly does, that the rule is observed Anot because it has been 
consented to, but because it is believed to be binding@ is really only to say that it has become 
international law.  How it became so is still the question, and it seems that at some point in the 
development the important factor was consent. 
 
B.  Consent in Treaty and Custom 
 
The controversy just examined has proceeded for the most part on assertions and counter-
assertions by publicists who have had an axe to grind with respect to positivism and dualism.  
But a recent article by MacGibbon in the British Yearbook has demonstrated that the element of 
consent at the basis of international custom is indeed the true explanation of such custom.FN85 
MacGibbon=s article is so documented and well-reasoned that it is difficult to believe that future 
discussion of customary international law will ever again assume the form it took prior to the 
publication of his paper.  For present purposes it will suffice to examine MacGibbon=s principal 
contentions with respect to general customary international law.FN86 
 
MacGibbon relies heavily on a statement of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice that is well worth 
quoting again: 
 
Where a general rule of customary law is built up by the common practice of States, 
although it may be a little unnecessary to have recourse to the notion of agreement (and a 
little difficult to detect it in what is often the uncoordinated, independent, if similar, 
action of States), it is probably true to say that consent is latent in the mutual tolerations 
that allow the practice to be built up at all; and actually patent in the eventual acceptance 
(even if tacit) of the practice, as constituting a binding rule of law.FN87 
 
[pg20] It is clear that consent is at the heart of the matter.  The opposite of consent, or 
protest, has the contrary effect of disestablishing the practice as legal.  The presence of consent 
or acquiescence, however evidenced, tends to endow the practice with a general stamp of 
approval, and after a reasonable period of practice tends to throw the burden on other states to 
protest.  Absent protest, a law is formulated binding on the world community. 
 
The problem of how to find evidence of this consent and what to do with the notion of 
opinio juris in this regard was considered in detail by MacGibbon and shall be examined shortly. 
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 For the present, however, let us assume it is possible to show consent to a practice by a state.  
Under this assumption, consider the relation between custom and treaty in the following 
hypothetical examples: 
 
(a.)  The United States launches a number of reconnaissance satellites over a continuous 
period of time to fly over the airspace of the Soviet Union for the purpose of photographing 
Russian military installations.  Although able to do so, Russia decides not to shoot down or 
otherwise interfere with these flights. 
 
(b.)  The United States and Russia sign a treaty, one provision being that neither nation 
will interfere with reconnaissance satellites launched  by the other.  The United States then 
launches a number of such satellites over a continuous period of time, and Russia does not 
interfere with them. 
 
1.  Duration of the Consent.COne of the apparent differences between the above two 
cases seen at first glance is that in case (a.)  Russia seems to be tacitly agreeing indefinitely to 
satellite overflights, a precedent obliging her to permit them henceforward, while in case (b.)  
she agrees conditionally until such time as she might choose to terminate the treaty. 
 
To answer this problem, reference might be had to the basic norm of international law:  
pacta sunt servanda.FN88 From the consent view [pg21] of international law it is seen that this 
is the norm which gives custom its binding force.  Thus, in case (a), if Russia allows four 
satellites to fly over its airspace, tacit consent enjoins it from shooting the fifth.  Similarly, pacta 
sunt servanda requires that Russia keep its treaty obligations in case (b).  Russia would be 
violating essentially the same norm whether it broke a treaty to fire on the satellite or violated a 
custom to which they had tacitly acquiesced. 
 
A more difficult question arises if the treaty is of limited duration, explicitly extending 
for, say, two years.  If at the end of that time Russia informs the United States that the treaty will 
not be renewed and that further flights will be interfered with, she would be within her rights 
according to the original agreement.  For the United States, in consenting to a two-year limit, 
impliedly consented to the possibility of an opposite rule at the end of two years.  But a similar 
result could be arrived at by custom.  Russia could submit initially a conditional protest—a 
protest that the United States stop its flights after two years, though they may continue in the 
interim.  Even in this case of limited duration treaties, there is great similarity  therefore between 
their operation and the operation of custom. However, it is only reasonable to consider such 
treaties very limited in the effect they may exert on customary international law, for if a treaty 
promises less than a universal rule of law, it cannot, barring special circumstances, be considered 
the equivalent of customary practice.  Most law-making treaties, however, and to a slightly lesser 
extent those treaties that extend for a given period of time with the proviso that they are to 
continue in force indefinitely unless notice be given in advance of termination, set up rules that 
purport to remain in existence indefinitely.  Such treaties are closest to customary practices. 
 
2.  Time at Which the Consent is Given.—Barring the question of limited duration 
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treaties, the differences between case (a.), overflights permitted, and case (b.), overflights 
permitted by treaty, are slight, and in many situations or instances would favor case (b.).  [pg22] 
For example, in case (b.) Russia=s consent is unequivocal.  Secondly, there is explicit reciprocal 
consent by the United States, rather than consent implied because the United States is the acting 
nation.FN89 Finally, from a practical standpoint in the modern world, it would be dangerous if 
situations analogous to case (a.)  were to be the usual way of creating law.  The United States 
would be risking the destruction by Russia of the satellites and moreover the heightening of 
international tension.  Making certain of Russia=s consent before launching obviates this danger. 
 
However, classic theory would hold that case (a.) would tend to generate international 
custom, and not case (b.).  (Of course several other nations or several more acts would be 
required, in the usual case, before a rule of noninterference with reconnaissance satellites would 
achieve universal recognition as binding.)  Is it not unreasonable to find a complete absence of 
rule-making force in the second set of facts?  The only great difference is a formal one—that 
Russia=s consent was received in advance rather than "discovered." The operative, substantive 
facts are the same.  Underlying the treaty, so to speak, is the practice of the states.  The only 
element that has shifted is the time in which consent is given.  In the first case the acting country, 
the United States, has impliedly consented to reciprocal acts by Russia simply because the 
United States launched the satellite.  Russia=s consent to the same principle is also implied.  Thus 
there is in this tacit agreement a union of wills—that reconnaissance satellites may travel 
unmolested.  In case (b) the same proposition is explicit.  Indeed, it may here be seen that custom 
resembles treaty practice in a very real sense.FN90 The treaty is a formal agreement to do acts 
which are in respect the same as acts which could form custom in the absence of treaty—the 
same pressures and motives may be inferred to exist in the states which perform these acts.  In 
other words, absent the treaty, the parties would have felt a growing need to do things in the way 
they legalized through the treaty. 
 
In 1806 Madison suggested this line of thought.  AOne evidence of general consent,@ he 
wrote, Ais general usage, which implies general consent.@  The rhetorical question followed:  
ACan express consent be an inferior evidence. . .?@FN91 
 
[pg23] 3.  Opinio Juris Reduced to Consent.—We have discussed, then, the similarity of 
consent in treaty and custom, in that consent may certainly exist in both, may be clearer in a 
treaty, and is perhaps different only as to the time it becomes evident.  Still, there is another 
matter which may be raised concerning a possible difference between the types of consent in 
cases (a) and (b), one which goes to the question of its quality. 
 
Under the classic theory, customary international law is composed of two elements: 
 
1.  usage—the repetition of similar acts by various states. 
 
2.  opinio juris sive necessitatis—the habit of doing certain actions Aunder the aegis of the 




The important question here is the nature of this latter psychological element.  Under the analysis 
of MacGibbon, the rather artificial psychological elementFN93 is replaced by the concepts of 
consent and acquiescence.  It might be helpful to present the consent thesis in a somewhat 
diagrammatic form.  Let us denote nation A as a somewhat diagrammatic form.  Let us denote 
nation A as the acting state and nation B as the state which is "involved" in this action.  Nation C 
is totally uninvolved, unconcerned, and unaffected by the acts of A.  There are three kinds of 
international acts possible—act X might be the sending of a satellite over the other nation.  This 
is a simple act, since B need do nothing positive in the way of acquiescence to allow this act to 
take place.  Act Y requires the positive cooperation of state B.  For example, by force majeure a 
vessel of A must dock within the territorial sea of B, and B assumedly must cooperate in the 
docking of the vessel.  The trickiest act is act Z, which is abstention from acting.  In the Lotus 
situation, act Z would mean that state A abstained from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a 
national of B, who on the high seas was responsible for a collision involving a vessel of A. 
 
When the opinio juris is thought of in terms of obligation, as MacGibbon tends to view 
it,FN94 proof would be required that when A performed act X, B would be obliged not to 
interfere.  An immediate difficulty of course is that if B does not interfere, there is little chance 
of discovering whether such inaction is due to a belief that interference is illegal or simply not 
worth the trouble and effort.  Nevertheless, there is some slight assumption that might be made.  
The fact that B was aware of the act and did not complain tends to show that B thought the act 
legal.  Of course, [pg24] this is very flimsy evidence, particularly in the case of a new act, such 
as the flight of a satellite, where there is no international law.  Here it is especially difficult to 
come to any conclusion as to B=s state of mind on the question of legality, since even if B were 
aware of the problem, B could not discover what international law would hold on the problem, as 
there would be no international law on the problem.  However, a state would likely protest if it 
objected to the action and felt protest reasonable, for fear that not doing so would establish an 
unwanted precedent.FN95 
 
On A=s side, to conceive of the act in terms of a claim of right presents similar 
difficulties.  How is it discoverable whether A did act X because A felt it was legal to do so, or 
because it desired to enough to act in a way it fell illegal, or that it acted without any 
consideration of the legality? 
 
In regard to act Y it is perhaps slightly less difficult to find opinio juris.  The fact of B=s 
action might be prima facie evidence of a feeling on B=s part that B ought to assist.  However, 
this manner of reasoning has drawbacks also, as it views nations as basically unfriendly, acting 
only in response to legal obligation. 
 
In practice, the only use of opinio juris by the International Court of Justice occurred 
with respect to act Z.FN96 In situation Z, state B is totally unaffected in physical sense.  What 
has transpired is simply that nation A has not acted with respect to a national of B.  This is the 
most extreme situation.  It is highly unlikely that any evidence of state of mind can be found with 
respect to B, the nation whose state of mind might have been construed in situations X or Y.  
Therefore the Court could not hope to find anything of international precedent value in 
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examining the practices of B.  It had to look to state A.  But state A, by hypothesis, did nothing.  
Here the Court laid down the requirement of opinio juris—that A=s abstention would have to be 
proved to [pg25] have been in response to a conviction of an international law requirement for 
abstention on A=s part.  Since A is the "actor" it would also be possible for the Court to see if A 
abstained under a claim of right, but while logically possible, this is absurd in practice.  No 
nation would feel the need to proclaim that it has a legal right not to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over the national of another state in such a situation.  The Court=s use of opinio juris 
in this, the most extreme situation does not logically compel the use of opinio juris in situations 
X and Y.  Indeed, as MacGibbon has shown, international tribunals have not resorted in practice 
to this artificial element advanced by the test writers. 
 
MacGibbon=s essay demonstrated that the operative fact about the reactions of B to the 
acts by A is whether or not B consented to the acts.  In older terminology, the wording would 
have been:  whether there existed a tacit treaty between A and B.  The opinio juris is a by-
product, as it were, of this consent:  AAcceptance of a course of conduct as lawful seems 
necessarily to involve the further otiose conviction that participants in the course of conduct are 
entitled to act as they are doing; and this in turn appears to leave little alternative to submission 
in the belief that submission is obligatory.@  And, it must be remembered, the opinio juris is 
really needed as evidence of the consent only in the extreme case where there is the absence of a 
positive act by the "acting" state. 
 
The foregoing analysis should not be compared with the formation of general 
international law by treaty.  Consent by way of a tacit treaty (custom) is not different in kind 
from consent in an express treaty.  The element referred to as opinio juris is only a by-product of 
consent used to give clear evidence of the consent.  But in situation Z, where the opinio juris is 
particularly relevant, a treaty would obviate the need for such opinio juris.  Thus if A agreed with 
B that neither would extend criminal jurisdiction over nationals of the other involved in 
collisions on the high seas, positive proof would be therein available of the consent.  No 
operative facts would change.  A would feel an obligation, under international law, not to 
exercise such jurisdiction.  Similarly, in cases X and Y, can proceed under a claim of right, and B 
is under an express treaty obligation to allow and assist A=s acts.  It might be argued that, absent 
the treaty, A might feel the opinio juris not to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of B, C, or 
D, while with the treaty A merely feel committed to a Aparticular@ law obliging A not to exercise 
such jurisdiction with respect to nationals of B only.  But this argument is no proof against the 
present thesis, which contends that if A and B sign such a treaty, the treaty tends to establish 
international law for all nations to the same degree that the development of a custom between A 
and B with respect to their own nationals would tend to form international law binding on all 
nations.  Thus under the present thesis, if A signs such a treaty with B.  there is some precedent—
namely, the treaty itself—for requiring A and B, a well as C and D, not to exercise jurisdiction 
over nationals of any other state who are involved in collisions on their own flag vessels on the 
high seas. 
 
[pg26] 4.  Proof of Consent and the Class of Acts to Which Consent May be Given. —
MacGibbon=s thesis, so complete in its analysis of opinio juris, does not seem adequately to 
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explain the operation of proof of acquiescence or consent.  When does usage become binding 
upon states?  In situations X, Y, and Z outlined above, there is usually no pressing need for states 
A or B to make legal claims about the validity or invalidity of their actions.  How then is a Aclaim 
of right@ and consent to that claim of right evidenced?  One way would be for the nations to say 
so, diplomatically or otherwise.  But as we have seen, there is no obvious motive for the states to 
make such claims.  Another way would be for A to execute an act and B to protest initially but 
eventually cease protesting while A continues the act.  This situation, which is probably 
relatively rare, would present evidence that A continues to act under a claim of right, since A=s 
attention was drawn to the question of legality by B=s protest.  Protest is indeed a useful device 
for proving that the act is done under a claim of right, but MacGibbon does not appear to have 
successfully resolved the dilemma that this creates; namely, that the only clear cases then where 
A is acting under a claim of right are the cases where B protests.  And yet it is precisely these 
cases which are practically useless for proving the existence or nature of an international rule 
simply because A=s assertion of right is canceled by B=s equally valid assertion that A lacks right. 
 
It appears, therefore, that (1) protest is the most valuable, or one of the most valuable, of 
tools for discovering whether a nation acts under a claim of right or submits under a felt duty, 
but (2) protest serves to cancel out the ability of the act to shape custom binding upon all nations. 
 Another approach is needed to determine legal consent or acquiescence.  I submit the following 
one, which appears to be consistent with judicial decisions: 
 
A presumption of consent is set up wherever a state executes an act which is capable of 
having international legal repercussions.FN97 For example, the denial by State A of a passport to 
one of its nationals is not generally considered to be an act coming under international law.  But 
if a passport to leave state A is arbitrarily denied to a national of state B, such an act is capable of 
being regulated by international law.  For there is a felt effect, a repercussion, on state B, even in 
this rather extreme case where the effect is on a national of B.  If state B has knowledge of this 
act yet fails to protest, state B is presumed to have acquiesced, and a rule of international law is 
on its way toward crystallization, to the effect that aliens have no right of egress.  Admittedly, 
the test of an act being generally viewed as coming within or without international law is not a 
static test, for the same reason that the sphere of international law is not static.  But this is not to 
say that the definition is circular, for it is not the opinion of A or B alone which is relevant, but 
the opinion of the court, publicists, and nations.  The contest of treaties will play a substantial 
role [pg27] in indicating the expanding scope of international acts.  But for the most part the 
scope will be clear enough:  an act of sending up a missile over another country would 
unquestionably be of international character; similarly, questions affecting the seas, outer space, 
diplomatic questions, etc., would easily be determinable as to their international legal character. 
 
This presumption seems to accord with the large claims made for the operation of 
customary international law by textwriters who certainly do not cite judicial opinions for every 
proposition advanced.  However, the test of presumed consent does not cover the Lotus situation, 
since there inaction could not be said to have an unambiguous Aeffect@ on the international scene. 
 Thus the present test does not contradict the reasoning of the Court in the Lotus case, the only 
case examining the psychological element in custom which the presumed-consent test replaces in 
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all but Lotus situations. 
 
This presumption forces states to protest or submit to practice which will become 
custom-forming.  It would be just as logical to have a presumption in favor of protest unless 
consent is manifested.  But such a presumption would not accord with results reached in most 
cases before international tribunals and cases involving international law before municipal 
tribunals.  For these tribunals have not had much difficulty in finding a transition from usage to 
custom, which difficulty would be painfully obvious if the presumption were reversed.FN98 
 
As mentioned above, there remains some problem in determining which acts are of 
international character, especially since the scope of international law may be expanding to 
encompass acts which were heretofore thought to be entirely within the sovereignty of a state—
for example, the diversion of water from a transboundary river at a point within the land area of 
the upper riparian.  With regard to treaties, however, the difficulty is obviated.  If a matter is 
included in a treaty, then—with one provisoFN99—the matter is ipso facto of international 
character. 
 
In sum, the differences between treaty and custom are that the treaty is a more reliable 
instrument of the evidence of international practice, of consent, and of international character of 
the act.  The similarities are the most crucial:  both are based on consent, and both involve 
practices undertaken in response to the compelling force of the norm pacta sunt servanda.  Both 
can encompass a large number of nations in the first instance, and both may affect a large 
number of third states.  Therefore whether the practice of states in the [pg28] international arena 
be consented to latently or patently, the practice itself together with the consent should be 
regarded as precedent for rules of international law.  This is not to say that treaties are a form of 
customary international law, or vice versa.  Rather, they are on a par with each other and should 
thus be considered as precedents for international law decisions. 
 
C.  The Role of Treaty and Custom in the Formation of New Law 
 
1.  In General. —  Nations sometimes enter into a treaty expecting or even saying that 
they are departing inter alia from the customary rule, but do not intend that the general rule of 
international law be changed as a result of the treaty departure.  For example, Article I of a treaty 
may recite the general rule of international law, and Article II may spell out an exception limited 
to the signatories.  The problem presented is the effect to be given to the signatory states= view 
that the international rule should remain the same for everyone else.  It is a logical corollary of 
the present thesis that the parties to a treaty should be denied the power of "removing the effect" 
of their treaty on the general rule of law.  Nations A and B ought not to be permitted to deviate 
from the rule at the expense of depriving other nations (in the absence of other treaties) of the 
new accommodation between A and B.  An international community is best made possible if 
rules of law tend to become general—that what is true for A and B becomes an addition to 
previous practices and tends to be a thrust toward a general rule.  Certainly this is the effect in 
the absence of treaty:  a change of practice between A and B would have international customary 
repercussions on the underlying international rule.  Even if A and B issue statements that the rule 
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of law for all other nations remains the same and is unaffected by the difference evidenced in the 
customary practice between A and B, and international tribunal would have no difficulty in 
holding such statements irrelevant—the operative fact being that the practice of A and B showed 
a tendency to change the international rule itself.  The only difference, again, that the treaty 
makes is that consent to the practice was achieved before, and not during, the practice. 
 
But at this point the reader might nevertheless object:  Do not A and B have the freedom 
and right to make a contract deviating from the international rule inter sese?  Why should they 
be burdened with the necessary corollary that their contract is a precedent for a change in the 
underlying rule for other states?  The answer is, I think, that the problem is not one of freedom of 
contract; it is international law, and not A and B, which indicates what the effect shall be of A=s 
and B=s actions on nations not party to the treaty between A and B.  And international law ought, 
consistently, to say to A and B that they cannot have their cake and eat it too—if they in fact 
change an international rule to suit themselves, other nations may benefit from the change.  
Otherwise it would be like giving effect to dictum of the most flagrant sort—that A and B do one 
thing, but lay down, not an irrelevant but an opposite, rule for nonparties.  The principle of 
freedom of [pg29] contract still allows A and B to make treaties with the other states, 
incorporating a rule that is opposite from the A-B rule.  In this manner they can isolate their own 
treaty.  But this burden of effort should be on A and B since they are claiming the benefit of 
international law in their use of a treaty. 
 
It should be emphasized that all these cases are extreme ones, used to demonstrate a 
thesis.  Nations usually would be happy, for instance, if the general rules they adopt in treaties 
were extended to all nations; a rule is essentially a reciprocal accommodation.  Moreover, a 
single attempt by A and B to set up a treaty differing from the underlying customary (or treaty-
established) rule would have little affect in changing the underlying rule.  A clearly established 
rule of international law will not be overthrown because of one bilateral treaty to the contrary, 
any more than it would be overthrown by a contrary practice developing between two states.  
But if there are many treaties of the A-B type, or if there is multilateral agreement, then the 
customary rule may be held to be changed.  And if this occurs, the treaties are proof positive that 
the other states did approve of the A-B "deviation." 
 
 
2.  The Problem of Change in the Law.FN100 — Deserving of special attention is the 
situation in which by general acknowledgment there has been established a fairly clear rule of 
customary international law in a given area.  If A and B conclude a treaty setting up a rule that 
derogates from this customary law, then, to the extent that this treaty is given effect as precedent 
 for nonsignatories, is not the treaty illegal?  To state the matter differently:  It may be argued 
that classic theory allows A and B to make a conventional rule between themselves that differs 
from the general customary rule precisely because the conventional rules does not have legal 
effect on states other than A and B.  If it did have such an effect, to that extent it could be argued 
that there is a violation of the existing customary rule. 
 
Two approaches shall be offered to meet this objection.  The first corresponds to the 
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argument that has been advanced in this paper.  The second is a modification which might appeal 
to the reader who decides not to accept the present thesis in its full form. 
 
(1)  The problem of bringing about peaceful change in international law, absent a super-
legislation, raises greater logical obstacles with respect to custom than it does in the case of 
treaties.  If nation A acts in a manner opposed to the rule of customary law—for the only way to 
change customary law is to initiate a contrary practice—such an act will be illegal with [pg30] 
respect to the rest of the international community.  But if nation A enters into a treaty with nation 
B allowing such an act, then the ensuing act is illegal—as stated above—with respect to all 
members of the international legal community except B.  Thus there is slightly less illegality 
about the act when a treaty precedes it.  In most cases B is likely to be the nation most affected 
by the act, so that the interests of C, D, and E are not so gravely affected by the breach of 
international customary law.  Further, in many situations A will sign a treaty with the several 
nations affected, which again removes the brunt of the illegality with respect to the states most 
affected and involved. 
 
But there is a more significant obstacle if changes in the law are to be brought about by 
the process of custom—an obstacle that does not seem to have been noticed by the publicists.  It 
is black-letter law that actions, in order to become customary and thus obligatory for other states, 
must be done Aunder the aegis of the conviction that these actions are legally necessary or legally 
right.@FN101 Yet given the hypothesis that nation A wants to change the law by acting in a 
manner contrary to the clear customary rule on the subject, it is difficult to see how A could think 
its actions were anything but illegal and wrong under international law.  Since A, again by 
hypothesis, is the first nation to act in contravention of international law, black-letter law would 
ascribe no force to the change of custom by A=s acts, since A lacked the requisite psychological 
intent to act in conformity with the law.  Thus the underlying customary law is totally unaffected 
by A=s acts.  By extension, when B does the same acts that A did, B likewise will have no effect 
on the underlying customary rule.  The only conclusion from this is that, once established, a 
customary rule cannot be changed by the forces of custom. 
 
Under the argument advanced in this paper, however, if nation A signs a treaty with B 
that A may do an act which would be contrary to the customary rule, at least A has the 
psychological assurance of acting correctly under the treaty.  In this sense, A has a claim of right 
to do the acts allowed by the treaty, the claim traceable back to international law and pacta sunt 
servanda.  Thus international law has furnished a way for A to do the act under a claim of right, a 
way which is logically impossible to do legally in absence of a treaty.  And indeed, it may be 
argued that this is precisely what has happened under international law.  In modern times, states 
have realized in many areas that the customary rule is outmoded, but rather than try to break 
down the customary rule by illegal actions which theoretically could not have an effect on 
changing the customary rule, the states have entered into treaties with other states who are 
principally involved in the contemplated action allowing such action.  Nations have turned to 
treaties because the process of customary law does not allow for change and modernization of 
the customary law.  In these circumstances, it would be anomalous to deny effect to the 
thousands of treaties, intended by the parties to bring about a change in the customary law, by 
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pretending that the treaties are nonexistent [pg31] except as to the signatories. 
 
(2)  A second way to deal with the problem of the illegality of a treaty with respect to 
third parties would be to deny to the first few treaties laying down a rule that is in clear 
derogation of international law any effect on third parties.  When these treaties are made public 
(by deposit with the United Nations or otherwise), other nations have the opportunity and 
obligation to give them scholarly and diplomatic consideration because the treaties are clearly 
stated and carefully concluded statements by the signatories as to what good practice is between 
them.  Schwarzenberger writes that Anone of the members of the international society can help 
being acutely interested in . . . the arrangements made between other States and the concessions 
made by them to each other.@FN102 After the passage of some time, and after the provisions 
have had a chance to sink into the prevailing international thought—and assuming little or no 
protect from other states—then the entire body of the similar provisions in these treaties effect a 
change in the particular international rule. 
 
It is perhaps a matter of the quantity of the treaties containing similar provisions and the 
time that has elapsed since the first treaty to have such a provision was ratified.  No hard and fast 
rule may be given when the difference in degree (the number of treaties) becomes a difference in 
kind (a change in the general international law).  But this problem is one that must always be 
faced, whether new customary practices are being compared with old ones, or whether new  
treatiesChowever theoretically affecting customCare being compared with the old rule.  The 
basic problem with the second alternative theory is that a difference in degree is held at some 
point to become a difference in kind.  Although this might indeed explain what international 
tribunals have done when faced with a large number of situations of treaties, the explanation 
seems at once less logical in a strict sense and more palatable in an immediate sense. 
 
To deny that the principle of pacta tertiis can be entirely and comfortably reconciled with 
the modern world—in which most nations find it prudent to embody what they feel ought to be 
done and what they might well do anyway in treaty form—is quite possible.  But to deny that 
treaties ought to have an effect on custom is to risk stagnation of customary international law. 
 
VII.  TREATIES  AND  SETTLEMENTS 
 
A.  The Nature of Settlements 
 
Although many treaties may be concluded with an intention to depart inter alia from the 
customary rule of law, and many may be [pg32] concluded without much consideration of what 
the law is, there exist a very significant number of bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded as a 
compromise or settlement of the parties= divergent opinions as to what actually is the underlying 
international rule.  What has ordinarily occurred in these cases is the rise of a dispute, its passage 
into diplomatic channels, its examination in legal terms and finally the agreement to settle the 
matter by treaty. 
 
A clear preliminary warning must be given against the idea that treaty settlements are 
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precisely the same as, say, a judicial decision on the dispute.  The operation of reaching the 
decision is rather different.  Should one hundred thousand acre-feet of water per month be the 
source of a dispute between states A and B, and should the diplomats of both states concede that 
an international tribunal would be about sixty per cent likely to decide for state A, the resulting 
treaty may well give sixty thousand acre-feet to A and forty thousand to B.  Before a tribunal the 
decision is much less apt to be so like a compromise. 
 
This is not to say that such treaties should have less weight than judicial decisions.  
Perhaps there is even reason to argue that, being in some sense more practical and being the 
decision of the parties involved, they should have more weight.  But there is no real necessity to 
decide.  The important matter is that, though different in some respects from judicial decisions, 
such treaties are similar in others and should not be overlooked as evidence of what in fact is 
operative international law.  Indeed, international tribunals are themselves set up ordinarily by 
treaties, and it is logically awkward to maintain that their decisions are far-reaching while the 
instruments that set up are not.  In practice, of course, there is no such awkwardness simply 
because people are psychologically prepared to accept judicial decisions as precedent-setting.  
But in practice also may many of the similarities between settlement treaties and judicial 
decisions be seen.  Practically speaking, treaty settlements of disputes are merely short-cut 
substitutes for judicial decisions.  Neither is there much difference between the two nations 
agreeing to have a judge decide the dispute, and agreeing to let two foreign-office officials 
decide by drawing up a treaty.  Like judges, the treaty-makers consider the position of existing 
law and work out a settlement based upon law that is, in its compromises, likely to be more 
practical than a decision.  Like a court, in this type of treaty, they will try to find" law rather than 
"make" it.  Both a decision and a treaty are in this sense "evidence" of law.  One ought not make 
too much of the word "evidence" in this connection; what is here argued is that such a treaty is 
valuable precedent for third parties, just as the judicial decision is precedent for parties other 
than the plaintiff and defendant. 
 
The treaty need not, of course, state a broad rule on its face in order to be labeled "law-
making"; one may be implied from the dispositions under the treaty.  When the treaty is the 
result of a settlement, what the parties have actually done—not necessarily the wording—may be 
generalized into a rule of law.  That is, the rule is deduced from the treaty as a whole and perhaps 
from the actual implementation as well.  For example, the United [pg33] States-Mexico treaty of 
1906FN103 does not say that the United States has a duty not to divert water from the Rio 
Grande.  Indeed the contemporaneous Harmon doctrineFN104 stated that the United States had a 
sovereign privilege to divert such water.  However, the treaty specifically provided for the 
guaranteed delivery to Mexico of a certain amount of water in the Rio Grande.  Taken as a 
whole, the treaty cuts against the contention of the United States that sovereignty allows 
diversion from a river without regard to hardships felt therefrom by the lower riparian.FN105 
Thus a treaty which appears to be a "contract" may, taken in a broader sense, indicate the view of 
the parties as to the requirement of international law.  Of course, when dealing with such a treaty 
it is relevant to consider whether there was a quid pro quo felt to be the equivalent of the 
"concession." In this case, if the United States agreed not to divert water in return for the 
disavowal of outstanding Mexican claims against the United States, and if the parties at the time 
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felt this to be an even exchange, no broad principle is deducible from such an exchange which 
would be relevant to the Harmon questions.  Lacking such evidence of bargaining, however, the 
treaty will be a reliable reflection of the opinions of a number of diplomats, lawyers, and 
legislators, and perhaps large segments of the populace of the nations as well.  As it should be 
accorded some influence in international law. 
 
But why, it might be asked, should a settlement be at all regarded as evidence or a source 
of international law while in municipal law settlements are not precedents for judicial decisions? 
 There are, perhaps, no strong reasons why municipal settlements are not more important.  
Practice might easily have evolved to the contrary.  Had there been a custom of recording out-of-
court settlements in early English law, subsequent courts, particularly when faced with issues 
which had no judicial precedent, most probably would have looked to the reports of the out-of-
court settlements as precedent.  Parties certainly act on the basis of these settlements; money 
changes hands; and all in all the settlements are very good evidence of what two opposing 
lawyers agreed was the force or state of the law in regard to their particular case.  Such 
settlements are more apt to be well-considered than some statements found in treaties; the latter 
may be written as fancy or responsibility dictates, but there is no cash payment if the statement is 
wrong.  Since most cases filed in court are settled out of court, there would have been a huge 
body of testimonial evidence to the actual operative rules of law in society had publishers of 
legal decisions extended their publication to settlements.  In a different context, a writer on the 
Nuremberg trials said:  AI need not repeat what has so often been emphasized, that to construct a 
system of common or customary law [pg34] must necessarily involve a system of law 
reporting.@FN106 The importance of this factor is too easily taken for granted.  While common-
law will not suffer irreparable damage if it is denied access to reports of settlements—simply 
because of the large number of decisions and statutes—international law in which most of the 
action is taken through treaties should not thoughtlessly overlook the relevance of a treaty 
settlement as persuasive evidence of what the parties agreed shall be, and has been, the operative 
rule of international law. 
 
B.  EXAMPLESCDiversion of Water from Transboundary Rivers 
 
A set of examples of the sort of settlements by treaty to which I refer has arisen out of 
disputes over transboundary rivers, and one of these, the Indus River dispute, has been much in 
the news lately.  A detailed examination of some of these river agreements should serve to 
clarify the argument being presented.  Initially, several questions may be asked:  Does an upper 
riparian have a duty under international law not to make substantial diversions which would 
cause damage to the lower riparian?  Is there simply a duty to work out an equitable arrangement 
with the lower riparian, whatever it may be?  Or is the Harmon doctrine of absolute sovereignty 
the rule of international law?  It is now so much relevant what the answers are as, finally, how 
and from what sources have the answers been obtained. 
 
1.  United States-Mexico.CThe Harmon opinion was delivered in December, 1895, when 
the question of diversion of the Rio Grande was becoming the serious center of a dispute 
between the United States and Mexico.  But an indication of the non-adoption of Harmon=s 
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absolute sovereignty principle was the action of the United States in enjoining a private company 
from building a dam at Elephant Butte, on the Rio Grande within the United States.  In 1906 the 
two countries concluded a treaty, wherein the United States agreed to deliver a stated amount of 
acre-feet of Rio Grande water to Mexico annually.  The treaty was highly detailed, and did not 
refer to broad principles of law except to disclaim any legal basis for Mexican damage claims 
against the United States.  The treaty included concessions by both sides:  Article II stated that 
the United States would bear all the expense of construction of a dam which would operate on 
the Rio Grande where it is part of the boundary.  Mexico, on the other hand, waived all damage 
claims arising from the diversion of water by citizens of the United States. 
 
Taken alone, it is difficult to draw any generalization that could lead to a rule of 
international law with regard to this treaty.  The negotiations and final treaty reveal too many 
exchanges and concessions by both sides, and it is very hard to determine what weight was given 
by the parties= understanding of the international [pg35] law requirement in absence of a treaty.  
It is possible to note the closeness of time between the Harmon doctrine and the treaty, and 
conclude that the United States did not in fact rely on the absolute sovereignty principle, for 
indeed the treaty Ain fact apportioned the water.@FN107  One writer says of the treaty that 
Aalthough the United States Government formally reserved its legal position, the actual dispute 
was settled by a rational agreement,@ and that Athe United States Government did not act upon 
his [Harmon=s] opinion in their relations with Mexico. . . .@ FN108  But if Mexico "paid" for the 
treaty insofar as it derogated from what the United States would have done in exercise of 
absolute sovereignty, very little can be deduced from the fact of the signing of the treaty.  On the 
other hand, nations often behave in a very practical manner; it may have been true that Mexico 
was able to bargain for a better than "equitable" arrangement in return for allowing the United 
States to place in the treaty the disclaimer that the treaty should not be evidence of any legal 
concession by the United States.  This would not have been an unreasonable stand by Mexico—
if she secured the substance of what she wanted, what difference would it make if the United 
States could recite words in a treaty disclaiming any legal obligation to do what the United 
States in fact did?  A legal advisor to the State Department has written that Ait is necessary to 
distinguish between what states say and what they do.@FN109 In this mode of analysis, it would 
be possible to conclude that the treaty of 1906 was in fact a settlement, and bears witness to an 
understanding by both countries that some kind of equitable apportionment is required by 
international law. 
 
Further support for this view may be derived from testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations which helped clear the way for the ratification of a treaty with 
Mexico limiting river diversions and setting up joint development and diversion projects.FN110 
The State Department testified that international law requires that the United States cannot refuse 
to arbitrate a demand by Mexico for additional waters of the Colorado.FN111 Counsel for the 
United States section of the International Boundary Commission testified in part that Attorney 
General Harmon=s opinion Ahas never been followed either by the United States or by any other 
country of which I am aware.@FN112 [pg36]These statements are helpful authority for the 
proposition that the 1906 settlement was required by international law and can thus be used as 
evidence of it.  The 1906 treaty as a whole may well be an instance of Thalmann=s general 
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conclusion that Atreaties concerning international waterways are therefore not so much the 
expression of a view deviating from generally accepted principles, but are rather a concrete 
application of them.@FN113 
 
2.  United States-Canada.—Concurrently with the Mexican negotiations, the United 
States was involved in diversion problems with Canada.  What was the effect of the Harmon 
opinion, which had been drafted with the Mexican situation in mind, in the Canadian 
deliberations?  No written statement by any of the United States negotiators has been found 
which indicates that the resulting Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909FN114 was intended to 
incorporate the Harmon rule of absolute sovereign control over diversions.FN115 The Canadian 
understanding was probably that it was not so intended.FN116 But Article II of the treaty does 
reserve to each Party Athe exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion. . . of all 
waters on its own side of the line. . . .@  Yet in the same sentence it is provided that injured 
parties on either side of the boundary line are entitled to sue in local courts (of the other side) for 
damages resulting from any diversion.  This might be interpreted to read consistently with 
Aexclusive jurisdiction@ in that neither Canada nor the United States may tell each other what to 
do, but will have to pay compensation for any injuries suffered.  Griffin reads the article more 
liberally; he does not see in the treaty any preclusion of resort to international channels by 
government espousal of claims in the event that injury results from diversion and the local courts 
do not provide a remedy.FN117 This is in part substantiated by the remarks of Secretary Root 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, what the phrase giving jurisdiction to local 
courts was inserted merely to expedite proceedings.FN118 In sum, although this treaty contains 
a general rule-type statement in Article II, it is far from clear what is intended—the Harmon rule 
or a modification. 
 
[pg37] Article II excepts from its scope other provisions in the Boundary Waters Treaty, 
and these other provisions are of importance.  Article VI subjects two rivers, the St. Mary (which 
flows north into Canada) and the Milk (which flows south into the United States) to the principle 
of equal apportionment.  Another special agreement concluded contemporaneously with the 
treaty was the modification by the United States of the Minnesota project, which had proposed to 
divert waters from the generation of electricity, so as to provide for diverting only an amount of 
water which would not materially interfere with Canadian public use of any of the waters.FN119 
A study of the circumstances surrounding the United States-Canada negotiations and ensuing 
treaty does not lead to any conclusive results concerning the question whether these nations 
entered into a settlement, in part or entirely, which was the best view of either side as to the 
requirements of international law in the absence of settlement.  Yet the facts again show that, 
despite what the parties said, numerous provisions and agreements were made which are 
Ainconsistent with the theory that the territorial sovereign can do as he pleases with the water 
upon his own territory.@FN120  
 
3.  India-Pakistan.—Even in a recent diversion dispute, it is difficult to uncover what the 
parties had in mind when they made various agreements.  When Pakistan became a separate state 
in 1947, an untouched question was what would happen to the various river systems crossing the 
boundary.  There was a period when the two nations exchanged notes and gave mutual 
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assurances, from 1947 to 1951.  Then in September 1951 India announced that she would 
diminish waters running down into Pakistan for Indian irrigation, in the exercise of her absolute 
sovereign rights.FN121 There was then a temporary truce as a United States-sponsored 
Lillienthal proposal was studied, but in 1954 India announced that she would not accept these 
proposals.FN122  A timely study by the International Law Association resulted in some 
agreements in Dubrovink, however.  Between 1954 and 1958, India progressively increased its 
withdrawals, yet did so Afor the most part under ad hoc agreements with Pakistan which related 
the increases to Pakistan=s ability to effect replacement with equivalent supplies from Pakistan=s 
western rivers.@FN123 In the New York conference of the International Law Association in 
1958, India and Pakistan agreed to a proposal that the United Nations Charter=s Article 33 
procedures be followed [pg38] and after a period of negotiations the dispute was reconciled by 
the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty.FN124 Although India argued throughout the proceedings 
that under a Harmon-type doctrine of absolute sovereignty she was entitled to withdraw any 
water, she did make the concessions outlined under pressure of world public opinion.FN125 
Counsel for Pakistan were confident that if the matter went before an international tribunal the 
tribunal would not hold the strict Harmon doctrine applied, but the preliminary stumbling block 
was that India would not agree to arbitral jurisdiction.FN126  If a treaty does result from these 
negotiations which provides for equitable treatment in light of the particular circumstances of 
each river, it may be deduced that India felt that if she did not sign such a treaty world public 
opinion would require her to submit to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice over the 
matter, and that this might result in a judgment worse from India=s standpoint than the treaty.  
Similarly, Pakistan may be surmised to have decided that the uncertainty of an international 
arbitration should give way toward the effort to agree upon a concrete treaty which would avoid 
further friction between the parties. 
 
 
The conclusions above reached with regard to the United States-Mexico, United States-
Canada, and India-Pakistan river disputes have been tentative and uncertain.  The materials 
available on these negotiations are probably as extensive as any available on many other treaty 
negotiations.  It is difficult to assess the various motives of the parties involved, if indeed strict 
assessment is desirable or even accurate.  Perhaps with respect to river disputes a generalization 
might be made that seems to follow from the fact that more than sixty states riparian to 
international rivers have made arbitral commitments with one or more of their neighbors, 
whereas only fifteen instances have been found where states have made no such 
commitmentsFN127—that by virtue of the process of settlement and avoidance of litigation, 
there may be said to have been created a rule of international law negating the Harmon doctrine. 
 It may be accurate that Athe frequency with which treaties on the utilization of boundary waters 
on modern state boundaries are concluded indicates that the prohibition of the unrestricted 
diversion of water corresponds to a universal legal principle.FN128 
 
 
[pg39]VIII.  TREATIES  AND  STATUTES 
 
During an inquiry into the effect of a treaty on nonsignatories, a parallel situation in 
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municipal law may be noticed:  the effect of a statute of one jurisdiction on a judicial decision in 
a separate jurisdiction.  It is becoming commonplace for courts in the United States to cite 
statutes in other jurisdictions in order to reach a result similar to such statutes judicially.FN129 
Statutes have been responsible for giving rise to civil and criminal conspiracy laws, and the 
statutes of frauds and uses have often been invoked in principle although not enacted in the 
particular jurisdiction.FN130  Married women=s acts, for example, have had enormous effect on 
the law of torts, domestic relations, etc.FN131 
 
It is more important to note the reasons for such use of statutes in common-law cases 
than to cite examples of such use.  Landis gives the example of Rylands v. Fletcher to show an 
important reason for citation of a statute.  This case, which has had an enormous impact on 
American tort law, was based on analogies with wild animals.  If Parliament in 1868 had adopted 
a rule similar to the Rylands decision, Landis notes, even if it had been the result of a thorough 
inquiry by a Royal Commission, and even if it had been approved by the same lords in the House 
of Lords who voted for Fletcher=s claim, such a statute in the Blackstonian-oriented nineteenth 
century would have Acaused no ripple in the processes of adjudication either in England or on the 
other side of the Atlantic . . . .@FN132 The lesson about the wastefulness of ignoring so much 
legal thinking has in large part been learned since 1868, and it is now seen that the policy 
reasons which ought to underlay judicial decision may be as validly evidenced by statutes as by 
previous judicial decisions.  Indeed, the public policy of a nation is more democratically and at 
least prima facie more accurately represented in legislation than it is in judicial decision. 
 
I would like to suggest that treaties of a law-making sort are, rather than being similar to 
contracts, very similar to statutes and should be similarly used—as precedent for decisions 
affecting third parties. 
 
It would be unenlightening to label as a contract the agreement that becomes a statute—
the agreement between Congress and president on a bill.  Rather, there is a unity of wills in 
regard to the common aim.  A law-making treaty (defined earlierFN133 where [pg40] the many 
differences between it and a contract were more fully discussed) much more closely resembles 
that sort of an agreement than it does a contract.  Its signatories are sovereign states on an equal 
footing; when these states agree on a rule binding for them the situation is very different from 
that which occurs when two men make a contract between themselves.FN134  It is very much 
like a situation when a court agrees on a decision, or legislators agree on a law, or when a court 
agrees on a decision, or legislators agree on a law, or perhaps when the people and their 
legislators make an agreement which defines or by referendum approves of a municipal law 
statute.FN135 Even in voting, the people elect legislators to do the public will; the resulting 
legislation binds both the people and the legislators.  In a parallel manner the treaty binds its 
signatories and can hold legal sway over as large numbers of people as municipal legislation. 
 
But even if treaties were as similar to contracts as to statutes, their close resemblance to 
statutes argues for their being treated as are statutes.  Manley O. Hudson published a collection 
of some thousands of treaties entitled International Legislation; it is this aspect of treaties that 
should not be ignored in judicial practice.  Since legislation itself has been recognized as a fit 
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precedent in judicial decision, ought not treaties to be accorded comparable recognition on the 
plane of international law? 
 
IX.  THE  BROADER  VIEW  POINTCSOME  QUOTATIONS 
 
To extend to treaties recognition as sources of law would not, I think, be inconsistent 
with the broad aims of international law.  Law itself exists because of the social nature of states; 
Agiven the idea of a community the idea of law follows as an immediate corollary.@FN136 
Individuals as well as states have social needs and are interdependent in the community.FN137  
In Brierly=s words, Athe existence of some kind of international law is simply one of the [pg41] 
inevitable consequences of coexistence in a world of a plurality of states necessarily brought into 
relations one with another.@FN138 Unless law in general serves the purposes of making an 
international community possible, it defeats itself.  For men only obey the law when they respect 
it, and they respect it when they can associate with the purpose of the law, which is to promote 
the community.FN139 Within a nation, this purpose is safeguarded to a large extent by a 
legislature responsive to the needs and desires of the community as a whole.  But internationally, 
the absence of a world legislature calls for particular attention to the compatibility of any 
proposed or existing source of law to the general purpose of the international community.   
 
Treaties are inherently peaceful (treaties of alliance, if universally extended, would leave 
no enemies to the alliance) and inherently accommodative.  These broad qualities serve to 
identify treaty law with the purposes of international law.  A number of writers have noticed 
these characteristics and have elaborated on them.  Thus, with regard to treaties as a source of 
general law, Madison wrote that they are formed in 
 
a mutual spirit of liberality and accommodation. . . necessarily founded in principle of 
reciprocal justice and interest. . . .  [In the negotiation of treaties of peace and treaties of 
commerce] the respective efforts and interests of the parties form those mutual checks, 
require those mutual concessions, and involve those mutual appeals to a moral standard 
of right, which are most likely to make both parties converge to a just and reasonable 
conclusion.  Nor is a sense of character without its effect on such occasions.  Nations 
would not stipulate in the face of the world things, which each of them would separately 
do, in pursuit of its selfish objects.FN140 
 
Also in the nineteenth century Calvo stated his agreement with Heffter that the texts of 
treaties are the most evident witnesses of Al=accord des gouvernements.@FN141 This sense of the 
compatibility of treaties and the improvement of international relations has been well restated by 
Hyde in 1940: 
 
Bi-partite as well as multi-partite treaties are useful repositories and enlightening vehicles 
of areas the acceptance of which by the international [pg42] society may be anticipated 
when they are worthy of it and when the success of the contractual experiment 
encourages the assumption of like obligations throughout its membership.  Agreements 




Finally, a quotation from Doctor Jenks, written in 1952, which applies equally to bilateral 
treaties: 
 
The obligations of multipartite legislative instruments are not, however, badges of 
continuing servitude; they are a necessary part of full cooperation in the international 
community and participation in them must therefore  be regarded as one of the hallmarks 
of emancipation. . . . We live in an age of rapid economic and social change, and if our 
legal system fails to respond to the widely felt and urgent needs of a developing 
international society, both its authority as a legal system and the prospect of developing a 
peaceful international order will be gravely prejudiced.FN143 
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
 
Unless treaties are accepted as a source of law for nonparties, international law will 
anomalously apply custom formulated a half century or more ago instead of the rules found in 
treaties, which have taken the place of custom in recent years.  And as the conclusion of treaties 
becomes more commonplace, changes in the law will be reflected entirely in the treaties.  Thus 
in many instances the application of the old customary rule will mean that the new standard of 
conduct prescribed in the treaties will be overlooked.  International law will, perhaps 
dangerously, apply outmoded rules of conduct to new situations.  For unless the present thesis is 
accepted, the only way to change customary international law (apart from a multilateral 
convention adopted by each and every existing state) would be through the process of usage 
accompanied by a claim of right consented by the involved states—a process which may lead to 
friction, miscalculation, misunderstanding, and over-assertiveness in order to gain desired 
concessions.  Nor would the claim of right be more than an empty claim, or the action derogation 
of custom be anything but illegal.  Should the development of international law be halted when 
nations secure the consent of other nations in advance of practice by way of treaty?  Has the 
[pg43] jurisprudence of international law placed states A and B in the position that if they 
conclude a secret treaty, a court may view the ensuing practice as a usage and may give it 
international effect in shaping customary law, whereas if the treaty were revealed to the world 
the same practice following the treaty would be dismissed as irrelevant to general international 
law? 
 
The practice of international tribunals as well as states indicates that the maxim of pacta 
tertiis has not been strictly followed.  But the lack of a theoretical explanation why it ought not 
to be followed has resulted in some inconsistencies of application as well as indeterminacy of 
predictability of international law.  Landis wrote of statutes in 1934 that Aperhaps, the major 
portion of the law is now skeletonized between the covers of the statute books.@FN144 The same 
is true of treaty law today; collections treaties in force far exceed any library shelf of 
commentaries on customary international law.  The vast treasures and resources of these treaties, 
representing the deliberate results of negotiations between states, should not be by-passed in the 
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